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LEIBNIZ ON WHETHER THE WORLD 
INCREASES IN PERFECTION 
Lloyd Strickland 
 
In a letter to Bourguet written on 5 August 1715, a little over a year before his death, 
Leibniz suggests that, on the question of the world’s perfection, ‘Two hypotheses can 
be formed – one that nature is equally perfect, the other that it always increases in 
perfection.’ (L664)1 He then proceeds to split the second option into two further 
                                                 
1 The abbreviations I use throughout when citing Leibniz are as follows: A = Sämtliche schriften und 
briefe, ed by Akademie der Wissenschaften, multiple volumes in 6 series, cited by series (reihe) and 
volume (band) (Berlin, 1923-). AG = Philosophical essays, trans & ed by Roger Ariew & Daniel 
Garber (Indianapolis, 1989). D = De summa rerum, trans by G. H. R. Parkinson (New Haven, 1992). 
DM = Discourse on metaphysics, cited by section number, various translations in AG, L, P, W etc. Dn 
= The philosophical works of Leibnitz, trans & ed George Martin Duncan (New Haven, 1908). E = 
Opera Philosophica, ed by J. E. Erdmann (Berlin, 1840). G = Die philosophiscen Schriften von 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed by C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols (Berlin, 1875-1890). GM = G. W. Leibniz: 
Mathematische Schriften, ed by C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols (Berlin, 1962). Gr = Textes inédits, ed by Gaston 
Grua, 2 vols with successive pagination (Paris, 1948). H = Theodicy, trans by E. M. Huggard (Chicago, 
1990). L = Philosophical papers and letters, trans & ed Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht, 2ed 1969). Mon 
= Monadology, cited by section number, various translations in AG, L, P, W etc. NE = New essays 
concerning human understanding, trans & ed by Peter Remnant & Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge, 
1996). P = Philosophical writings, trans & ed G. H. R. Parkinson (London, 1973). Pr = Protogaea, ed 
by Jean-Marie Barrande (Toulouse, 1993). S = Monadology and other philosophical essays, trans & ed 
by Paul Schrecker & Anne Martin Schrecker, (Indianapolis, 1965). W = Leibniz Selections, trans & ed 
by P. Wiener (New York, 1951). I have generally used an English translation where available. Where 
no English translation is available the translation is my own. My translations have greatly benefited 
from the advice of Patrick Sherry, John Thorley and Elizabeth Vinestock. 
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hypotheses, first that the world has been increasing in perfection since its inception at 
a first moment, and second that it has been increasing in perfection from all eternity. 




Here, rectangle A corresponds to the hypothesis that the world remains equally perfect 
at all moments of its (eternal) existence, hyperbola B to the hypothesis that the world 
has been increasing in perfection from eternity, and triangle C to the hypothesis that 
the world had a beginning and has increased in perfection since then. 
     Before we attempt to ascertain which of the three hypotheses gets Leibniz’ 
support, we need to be clear about what we mean by the term ‘perfection’. Leibniz 
identifies three varieties of perfection in all, viz. the metaphysical, physical and moral. 
It is notable that whenever he talks of perfection without specifying any particular 
kind, he almost always means metaphysical perfection, and this can be seen by 
looking at the many places where he attempts to define the notion of perfection (e.g. 
D99, D97, D45, Gr324, Gr529, DM §1 etc.). The other two kinds of perfection are 
usually either referred to in full as physical perfection and moral perfection, or more 
frequently by the words pleasure and happiness for the former, and virtue for the 
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latter.2 So for Leibniz, the question of whether the world increases in perfection is 
likely to be a question of whether the world increases in terms of metaphysical 
perfection. We shall therefore consider the question in this way, and accordingly all 
references to perfection should henceforth be understood as referring to metaphysical 
perfection. 
     What, though, is metaphysical perfection? Leibniz defines it as a form, quality or 
attribute that is ‘positive and absolute in essence’ (i.e. it expresses what it expresses 
without limit) (Gr324). This rather abstract characterisation appears to offer no clues 
as to which forms, qualities or attributes qualify as perfections, but Leibniz believes it 
is sufficient for him to pick out several clear examples:  
 
We must also know what is meant by a perfection. A fairly sure test of it is this 
one: those forms or natures which are incapable of a highest degree are not 
perfections; for example the nature of number or figure. For the greatest number 
of all, or the number of all numbers, and the greatest of all figures are concepts 
which imply contradiction, but the greatest knowledge and omnipotence involve 
no impossibility (DM §1) 
 
In fact Leibniz usually identifies three, not two, separate qualities that together, in 
their ultimate form, constitute the perfections, and these are omnipotence, 
omniscience and omnibenevolence (or perfect goodness); that is to say, of course, that 
he identifies perfections with the attributes of God (cf. H127, H217, L639, Mon §48). 
The perfections of created things are taken to reside in the extent to which they 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking Leibniz takes physical perfection to consist in pleasure, while happiness is just an 
enduring state of pleasure.  
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measure up to God, that is, by the degrees of power, knowledge and goodness that 
they contain (cf. H51). So the degree of perfection for any created thing at any given 
moment is a function of how powerful, wise and good it is at that moment (and by 
‘created thing’ I mean a substance, soul, creature or monad, terms which I shall treat 
as interchangeable throughout this paper). 
     This gives us a measure of the degree of perfection for an individual substance, but 
what of the world? I would concur with George Gale’s analysis that the total 
perfection of the world at any given moment is the sum of the perfection of every 
substance in that world at that moment.3 From this it is easy to see that an increase in 
the world’s perfection would manifest as it having a larger total for this sum at one 
time than it did at a previous time. But what, exactly, could bring this about? As I see 
it, there are two ways in which the perfection of the world could be increased in a 
Leibnizian Universe. The first is that there are more substances at time t than there 
were at a time before t. The second is that there are better, i.e. more perfect substances 
at time t than there were at a time before t. The first option is ruled out by Leibniz’ 
insistence that the total number of substances remains the same over time.4 So if there 
is going to be an increase in the perfection of the Universe then it will have to come 
from the fixed number of individual substances themselves becoming more perfect 
over time. This also can happen in one of two ways: firstly, by some or all things 
increasing in perfection over time and none actually decreasing; secondly, by some 
substances increasing in perfection and others decreasing, where these changes always 
                                                 
3 George Gale ‘On what God chose: perfection and God’s freedom’, Studia Leibnitiana 8 (1976) 75. 
4 The reasons for this have been well documented by Donald Rutherford. See Leibniz and the rational 
order of nature (Cambridge, 1995) ch. 7 
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lead overall to a net increase in perfection (i.e. the increases are consistently greater 
than the decreases).5 
 
The hypothesis of the rectangle 
Returning, then, to the matter at hand, that of whether Leibniz accepts or rejects the 
notion of a Universe increasing in perfection, we discover that immediately after 
laying out the competing hypotheses of the triangle, rectangle and hyperbola, Leibniz 
tells Bourguet that he does ‘not yet see any way of demonstrating by pure reason 
which of these we should choose’ (L664). The matter remains under discussion 
throughout the rest of their communication of 1715-16, though most of Leibniz’ 
subsequent remarks are just concerned with clearing up some of Bourguet’s 
misunderstandings. However in another of these exchanges,6 after putting Bourguet 
right on the question of whether the hyperbola hypothesis entails the necessary 
existence of the world, Leibniz reiterates his stated view that ‘it is not that easy to 
decide between the three hypotheses, and it is still necessary to engage in a lot of 
                                                 
5 It could be argued that an increase in the world’s perfection could also come via a reculer pour mieux 
sauter, where there would be periods of time when the total perfection of the world actually decreases, 
and others when it increases, with the increases outweighing the decreases over the course of time. 
However this seems to conflict with the triangle and hyperbola hypotheses, both of which call for a 
smooth continuous increase in perfection without any retrograde steps. 
6 From an undated letter, probably written around mid-to-late March 1716. The letter in question is a 
reply to two of Bourguet’s letters, one from 7 February 1716 and the other from 16 March 1716. In the 
undated reply Leibniz asks Bourguet to obtain for him some silkworm eggs. In Leibniz’ next letter, of 3 
April 1716, he thanks Bourguet for having done just this, which suggests the undated letter was written 
mid-to-late March 1716. 
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meditation in order to come to any conclusion.’ (G III 589) We find similar doubts 
expressed in the Theodicy, published 5 years beforehand: 
 
It might be therefore that the universe became even better and better, if the 
natures of things were such that it was not permitted to attain the best all at 
once. But these are problems of which it is difficult for us to judge. (H253-4) 
 
Curiously, however, Leibniz does express a preference elsewhere, for the rectangle 
hypothesis in fact. In an early letter (1674) he informs a correspondent that, ‘whatever 
has happened, is happening, or will happen is best’ (L147). Now by applying the term 
‘best’ to the past, present and future, Leibniz is saying more than that the series as a 
whole is best, taken over its entire history. In fact he is suggesting that the universe is 
as perfect as it can be at every moment of its being, and passes from one moment to 
the next under the burden of being unimprovable. For clearly ‘whatever has 
happened’ would not be best on either of the two progressionist hypotheses (the 
triangle and the hyperbola), as on those models the world increases in perfection over 
time, each state of the Universe being better than the previous one. Thus Leibniz’ 
statement about things having always been the best would sit uneasily with either the 
triangle and hyperbola hypotheses, and must be considered as approval for what he 
would later call the rectangle hypothesis.  
     There is further evidence for this view. In a short, previously untranslated paper 
entitled An mundus perfectione crescat (Whether the world increases in perfection), 
dated by Gaston Grua to c.1694-96, his opening words are these: 
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The question is whether the whole world increases or decreases in perfection, or 
whether in fact it always preserves the same perfection, as I rather think, even if 
the different parts variously exchange perfection between themselves, so that it 
is mutually transferred. (Gr95) 
 
The words ‘as I rather think’, while not exactly a ringing endorsement of the 
hypothesis of the rectangle, nevertheless suggest that, even during his mature period, 
Leibniz viewed the hypothesis favourably.7 Despite the recent resurgence of interest 
in his theodicy, this paper seems to have gone largely unnoticed by Leibniz scholars,8 
and consequently also the fact that he leans towards the rectangle hypothesis in it. 
     On the basis of the passages considered thus far we might tentatively argue that 
Leibniz favoured a statically perfect world for at least some of his mature period 
before becoming uncertain by around 1710 at the latest. 
 
Evolution 
A wholly different view has been put forward by Arthur Lovejoy. He accepts that 
there are grounds for thinking Leibniz ‘adhered to the conception of a static universe’ 
                                                 
7 In the Theodicy Leibniz does say that ‘One cannot even wish that things may go better, when one 
understands them’ (H199) though this remark seems intended to apply to the series as a whole, and 
therefore probably does not count as evidence for his favouring the rectangle hypothesis in that work. 
8 E.g. Donald Rutherford, in his excellent examination of Leibniz’ theodicy Leibniz and the rational 
order of nature (Cambridge, 1995), does not mention it at all. And Andrew Carlson, in his The divine 
ethic of creation in Leibniz (New York, 2001), does not quote from anything found in either of Grua’s 
2 volumes. 
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but argues that ‘the evidence is, on the whole, against it.’9 In his seminal work The 
Great Chain Of Being he argues that Leibniz’ vision of the Universe was one of 
‘endless Becoming’, and pins this belief to some extent on the picture of Leibniz as 
someone who accepted the occurrence of ‘phylogenetic advance’, that is, the 
transformation, the evolution, of species.10 For example, in the Protogaea (1690-91), 
according to Lovejoy, Leibniz tells us that, it is ‘worthy of belief that in the course of 
the vast changes [which have taken place in the condition of the earth’s crust] even 
the species of animals have many times been transformed.’11 I say ‘according to 
Lovejoy’ here as it is highly doubtful that Leibniz does endorse a transformationist 
account in the Protogaea. For instance, in §6 Leibniz draws back from an outright 
endorsement of at least one evolutionary hypothesis, cautioning against the view that 
animals were once all aquatic before becoming amphibious and moving on to the 
Earth, because it ‘disagrees with the writers of the Holy Scriptures, to depart from 
whom is a religious offence’ (Pr26). And in §26, from which Lovejoy’s quote comes, 
Leibniz considers the question of why there seem to be so many ‘species in stones’ 
which cannot now be found anywhere, and answers that they probably are still 
around. He takes the example of a kind of large ammonite that had been found in 
fossils yet apparently is no longer present in the sea. He then asks the rhetorical 
question, ‘But who has fully explored its hidden recesses, or the subterranean 
abysses?’ (Pr90) before going on to explain that fossils are swept up by floods from 
                                                 
9 Arthur O Lovejoy The Great Chain Of Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964) 255-6. Lovejoy does 
not mention or quote from Whether the world increases in perfection and was presumably unaware of 
it, as it was published in a volume by Grua more than decade after Lovejoy ascribed a philosophy of 
amelioration to Leibniz. 
10 Lovejoy op cit 259. 
11 Lovejoy op cit 256, from Pr 90.  
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distant places, which accounts for why they are found in places where there are no 
living animals of the same species. Likewise the ‘whirlpools of the sea’ account for 
why some fossils seem to collect only in one place, ‘such as in Malta alone we 
wonder at the huge number of shark’s teeth which we call glossopetrae,’ while even 
now storms ‘throw up kinds of molluscs onto our coasts which fishermen do not find 
in the nearby sea.’ (Pr92) Leibniz thus envisions a variety of natural processes to 
explain why one can look in vain for living members of species that have been found 
in fossils, and why one may not find fossil records of species that are common today. 
All of which suggests that that when Lovejoy imputes to Leibniz the view that ‘many 
species of organisms which existed in earlier periods of geological time have now 
become extinct and that many known to us were then apparently non-existent,’ he 
does so erroneously.12 
     But what of the passage cited by Lovejoy that we considered above, where Leibniz 
appears to view transformation among species as ‘worthy of belief’? This can be 
attributed to another error on Lovejoy’s part, as the passage is more accurately 
translated as, ‘It is quite credible that during those great changes the species of 
animals have still remained mostly unchanged.’ (Pr90)13 Lovejoy appears to have 
been confused by the Latin word ‘immutatus’ which can mean ‘changed’ or 
‘unchanged’, but had he taken account of the context in which the word appears he 
would have been drawn to the correct translation of the term, as in the Protogaea 
Leibniz is clearly unimpressed by the evolutionist argument. 
                                                 
12 Lovejoy op cit 256. 
13 The Latin is ‘Et credibile est per magnas illas conversiones etiam animalium species plurimum 
immutatas.’ (Pr89) 
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     Despite this, there certainly does seem to be evidence that in his later writings 
Leibniz advocates at least a limited form of evolution among creatures. For example, 
in a letter to Thomas Burnett of 1696, he explains that, ‘species can be greatly 
changed by the length of time, as by the interval of places, witness the differences 
between the animals of America and those of our region.’ (G III 184)14 While this 
seems pretty clear-cut, I believe we should reserve judgement on it until we have 
considered what Lovejoy takes to be perhaps the best evidence for Leibniz’ 
endorsement of evolutionism, which is to be found in the New Essays Concerning 
Human Understanding (1704). Leibniz writes there that 
 
Various cat-like animals, such as the lion, the tiger and the lynx, may once have 
been of the same race and may now amount to new subdivisions of the ancient 
cat species (NE317) 
 
This remark appears during a discussion about the mixing and crossbreeding of 
species to produce viable offspring that are different from both parents. While Leibniz 
acknowledges the existence of these hybrids, his preference is to place them within 
the current range of species (as a subdivision) rather than considering them to belong 
to a wholly new and previously unactualised species. This approach is adopted again 
when Leibniz switches his attention from cats to dogs: 
 
There are such great differences amongst dogs that mastiffs and lap-dogs can 
very well be said to be of different species. Yet it is not impossible that they are 
the remote descendants of the same or similar breeds, which we would find if 
                                                 
14 Lovejoy overlooks this particular reference. 
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we could go back a long way, and that their ancestors were similar or the same, 
but that after much change some of their descendants became very large and 
others very small (NE325) 
 
He then proceeds to throw doubt on the suggestion that different breeds belong to 
different species, as ‘it would not be offending against reason to believe that they have 
in common an unchanging specific inner nature which is not further subdivided in our 
world’ and ‘which is further varied only by the addition of accidents.’ (NE325) Here 
Leibniz relies on the notion of a natural species, that is, a species fixed by God. If all 
species are natural in this sense, as Leibniz seems to imply, then there is a species 
called cat, another called dog, etc., and each is defined by an unchangeable inner 
nature that all individual members must possess no matter what their accidental 
properties might be.15 Leibniz extends the argument to show that “Negroes, Chinese 
and American Indians” likewise do not belong to different species in spite of their 
obvious outward differences, but are all in fact human on the grounds that they all 
possess reason, which he takes to be the defining feature of the human species 
(NE326). He then observes that 
 
as we find among us no fixed inner feature which generates a subdivision, we 
have no grounds for thinking that the truth about their inner natures implies that 
there is any essential specific difference among men. (NE326) 
                                                 
15 Leibniz does say that we cannot be sure if the natural species fixed by God correspond with the 
division of species biologists make in their tables of classification, so consequently the question of 
whether the word cat, for instance, denotes a true species in its own right, is open to conjecture. 
Nevertheless we know species boundaries to be fixed because God takes care ‘to ensure that the species 
should be immortal’ (H414). 
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Leibniz would thus no doubt agree with Aristotle’s dictum that ‘man generates 
man,’16 though he would allow that within species boundaries there can be vast 
differences between individuals, even differences that accumulate over time (and in 
many cases because of human intervention) to produce animals with different 
accidental properties to those that have come before (this, I think, is what Leibniz is 
getting at in his communication with Burnett cited above as the remarks are prompted 
by the discover of an ‘elephant-like’ fossil). 
     Lovejoy appears to ignore all this and argues that, so far as Leibniz was concerned, 
in earlier ages ‘the number of [natural] species was obviously vastly reduced [from 
what it is today], and the descent of most forms commonly regarded as of different 
species from common ancestors differing very greatly from most of their descendants 
is implied.’17 But as we have seen, that is not implied at all: the individuals 
representing a species might change over time to form sub-varieties, but species 
themselves do not change. Thus it is important to note that Leibniz nowhere suggests 
that the number of species around today is greater than the number of species existing 
in the past. In fact he advocates the very opposite view in a letter to Wagner from 
1710: ‘a soul or an animal before birth or after death differs from a soul or an animal 
living the present life only by conditions of things and degrees of perfections, but not 
by entire genus of being.’ (W506) To fully understand this we must refer to Leibniz’ 
acceptance of the then-vogue theory of preformationism. Following Leeuwenhoek, 
Leibniz held that all animals (men included) that were to develop throughout the 
                                                 
16 Aristotle De partibus animalium 2.1 646a35, Metaphysics 7.7 1032a25, from The complete works of 
Aristotle, trans & ed by Jonathan Barnes (New Jersey 1984). 
17 Lovejoy op cit 366. 
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course of the universe began as spermatic animalcules, that is, miniature versions of 
the animals they were to become, that were present in the semen of all previous 
generations of animals. It is, he states, ‘doubtful that an entirely new animal is ever 
produced but that living animals as well as plants exist in miniature in the seeds 
before conception’ (L589). Moreover, Leibniz holds that animals never truly die, in 
the sense that they are wholly extinguished. Hence ‘an animal ... will not end 
naturally; thus death…will be nothing other than an involution and diminution of the 
animal, when it returns from the state of a large animal to the state of an animalcule’. 
(E464) So what he tells Wagner is that before birth, a creature in an animalcule state 
already belongs to a particular species, and it remains a member of that species even 
after it dies (or falls into slumber, as Leibniz often puts it). With the total number of 
creatures fixed for all eternity it follows that the total number of species will be too, 
and there is thus no scope for any increase in the number of the latter nor, 
consequently, for phylogenetic advance. 
     Even if the number of species does not change, perhaps the fact that Leibniz allows 
there to be new hybrids, cross-breeds and sub-varieties within species is sufficient to 
support Lovejoy’s claim that the Leibnizian Universe is ameliorative? Before we 
assess whether this is so, it is worth getting clear what we mean by ‘new’ here. After 
all, we must remember that there were lap-dogs, for instance, in an animalcule state 
long before the first lap-dog was ever born, their seeds being contained in the bodies 
of creatures belonging to a different sub-species (but same species). Technically, then, 
the sub-species of lapdog has always been present in the physical Universe, even 
before the first member of that sub-species achieved ‘large animal’ state in the world. 
Therefore when Leibniz talks of the sub-species of lapdog being new, what he is 
referring to is the moment when the first lapdog animalcule developed into a ‘large 
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animal’, that sub-species being new only to the physical world of our day-to-day 
experience and not the physical world per se. Thus Lovejoy can only paint Leibniz as 
a progressionist if intra-species change, understood in the way described above, gives 
rise to more perfect ‘large animals’. But nowhere does Leibniz say that the process of 
intra-species change makes the world better, or more perfect, or that new breeds/sub-
varieties are better than those already in existence (or those that have perhaps died 
out). While Lovejoy needs Leibniz to claim that his restricted version of evolution 
leads to there being either more things or better things, Leibniz in his stubbornness 
claims only that it leads to different things. 
     But might it not perhaps be argued that there is a presumption of improvement 
here? That intra-species change, even understood as the limited doctrine I have 
presented above, gives tacit support to either the triangle or hyperbola hypotheses?  
Such an assertion would be unwarranted. In fact, when discussing the rectangle 
hypothesis with Bourguet, Leibniz argues that if the hypothesis is true then ‘change is 
appropriate, in order that there should be more kinds or forms of perfection, even if 
they are equal in degree.’ (G III 593) Lovejoy employs this passage to bolster his own 
case, thereby ignoring the context in which it arises, which is only to illustrate the 
point that change is consistent with, and perhaps even required by the hypothesis of 
the rectangle.18 Leibniz makes a similar point in the Theodicy, when he considers the 
suggestion that the best possible world would be an eternal substance that could not 
                                                 
18 In fact Lovejoy assumes the passage is saying that there should be more ‘species or forms of 
perfection,’ but the word ‘espèce’ was typically used by Leibniz to means ‘kind’ or ‘sort’, and it would 
only be defensible to translate it as meaning a biological species if the context was squarely biological 
or zoological, which is not the case here. 
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change. There his reply is this: ‘the best may be changed into another which neither 
yields to it nor surpasses it’ (H253). The point is illustrated by the transition from 
 
enjoyment of music to enjoyment of painting, or vice versa from the pleasure of 
the eyes to that of the ears, [where] the degree of enjoyment may remain the 
same, the latter gaining no advantage over the former save that of novelty 
(H253) 
 
To Bourguet he makes the exactly the same point: that on the hypothesis of the 
rectangle, ‘Although the Universe will always be equally perfect, it will never be 
sovereignly perfect, for it always changes and gains new perfections, although it loses 
some old ones’ (G III 589). So while change has occurred, there is no reason to 
assume that the Universe has become any better on account of it. 
 
Progress 
Lovejoy’s bolt is not yet shot, however, and he claims that there is solid evidence for 
Leibnizian progressionism in a letter written to the Electress Sophie in November 
1696, where it is stated that rational souls ‘advance and ripen continually, like the 
world itself, of which they are images’ (G VII 593)19 The letter continues to say that, 
‘because there is nothing outside the universe which could prevent it, it must be that 
the universe continually advances and develops’ (ibid). And a little further on, Leibniz 
informs his correspondent that, ‘it is a certain truth that every substance must attain all 
the perfection of which it is capable, and that is already found within it, enveloped as 
                                                 
19 Lovejoy quotes from Klopp, Werke VIII 15-16, but the letter being quoted is nowadays more readily 
available in Gerhardt which is why I have given a reference to that. 
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it were’ (ibid).20 Lovejoy suggests that this ‘attainment of all the perfection of which a 
substance is capable’ is cumulative, i.e. that as time goes on more and more 
substances will reach their capacity for perfection. If that is right then Leibniz surely 
did believe in a world increasing in perfection, for the perfection of the world is 
merely the sum of the perfection of its parts, and if its parts become more and more 
perfect then the world too becomes more and more perfect. 
     Again, however, we find that when these passages are considered in their proper 
context they do not lend as much support to Lovejoy’s hypothesis as they do when 
presented as standalone bite-sized quotes. Leibniz’ principal aim in this letter to 
Sophie is to present his various ideas about the soul – that all substances are souls, 
that they are ‘just as durable as the world itself’, and consequently are ‘exempt from 
death.’ (G VII 592-93) We already know, from a passage cited previously, that ‘a soul 
or an animal before birth or after death differs from a soul or an animal living the 
present life only by conditions of things and degrees of perfections, but not by entire 
genus of being’ (W506). So while souls may indeed attain all the perfection of which 
they are capable, this ought to be understood as something that happens for a very 
short time only, when they are at their peak during this life.21 And when this life ends, 
although souls do not technically die in the sense that they are obliterated, 
nevertheless they will lose some or perhaps even most of the perfection they had 
during their normal life. Thus all souls undergo an increase and decrease in perfection 
respectively, and an overall increase in the world’s perfection can only arise if the 
                                                 
20 Lovejoy translates the latter part of this sentence as ‘and which is already found in it, though in an 
undeveloped form’. The French is ‘et qui se trouve déja dans elle comme enveloppée.’ 
21 This is confirmed elsewhere, as Leibniz explains that a soul ‘is unable to develop all at once all the 
things that are folded within it.’ (Mon §61) 
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individual increases are consistently greater than the individual decreases. But Leibniz 
does not say that this happens. 
     Of course he does talk of a soul ripening. But here he is doing nothing more than 
expounding his doctrine of universal expression. This doctrine holds that the 
relationship of any given soul to another is one of representation or expression; that is, 
every soul represents or expresses every other soul, and all souls are perpetual mirrors 
of the whole Universe. As he explains it to the Electress Sophie in the very same letter 
of November 1696 that we have been considering: 
 
every soul...has to be as durable as the world itself, of which it is the perpetual 
mirror. Those mirrors are themselves universal, and every soul is an exact 
representation of the universe in its entirety. (G VII 592) 
 
Thus when soul A changes, the internal states of every other soul change too, because 
they express or mirror this change in A. The point Leibniz is trying to get across to the 
Electress Sophie is that even after a soul falls into slumber, it remains active inasmuch 
as it continues to represent the Universe and every change experienced by every other 
soul throughout the entire Universe. It is said to be active because these representative 
states are not caused by anything external to it, but are enclosed or enveloped within it 
and are unfolded over time by the soul’s own power. The ripening of a soul is thus no 
more than a poetic way of referring to this process of continual expression of the 
Universe for as long as both soul and Universe persist. 
     Likewise, his remark in the same letter that the Universe ‘continually advances and 
develops’ because there is nothing outside it which could prevent it from doing so, 
says little more than that the Universe itself – taken as the sum of all substances and 
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their expressions - continues to unfold, accumulating changes as it does so. If this 
interpretation seems a little implausible, note that Leibniz proceeds to illustrate his 
claim that the Universe ‘continually advances or develops’ by way of the following 
astronomical analogy: 
 
The movement of the planets appears to be a confused matter to us who are on 
the globe of the earth. It seems that these stars are wandering and that they move 
without any rule, that they sometimes move forwards, and that afterwards they 
move backwards, and even that they stand still from time to time. But when we 
placed ourselves, with Copernicus, in the sun, at least with the eyes of the mind, 
we have discovered a wonderful order. (G VII 593) 
 
Leibniz’ choice of analogy here is telling, as the planets can be said to advance only in 
the sense that they continually follow their ordered course. But this kind of 
advancement or development must be understood in a very neutral way, rather like the 
way the advance of time or the development of a story is understood, i.e. as a progress 
from state to state. For progress to be made it is irrelevant whether succeeding states 
are better, worse or equal in value to preceding states. And just as the planets are only 
seen to continually advance when viewed from the right perspective, so also with 
individual souls or the Universe as a whole – their advancement or progress can only 
be appreciated if they are seen, or rather understood, in the right way, i.e. through the 
tenets of Leibniz’ philosophy, which reveals there to be continual advancement 
despite appearances to the contrary. Thus even when souls seem to ‘stand still’ and do 
not undergo any changes in their degree of perfection, they nevertheless continue to 
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mirror all of the ensuing changes in the Universe, and accordingly they make progress 
in the neutral (i.e. value-free) sense of the term. 
     It ought to be noted here that Leibniz usually expresses his ideas very clearly in his 
correspondence, particularly in his correspondence with women, and if he had meant 
to say to the Electress Sophie that the world was getting better, i.e. increasing in 
perfection, then it ought to be considered rather odd that he did not say it outright. The 
reason why he elected not to do so, I think, is that such a hypothesis did not 
correspond with his views at the time. 
 
Cultivation and development 
But did it correspond to his views just one year later? Lovejoy implies as much when 
he suggests the ‘hypothesis of continual advance’ is demonstrated in a piece dating 
from November 1697: 
 
A cumulative increase of the beauty and universal perfection of the works of 
God, a perpetual and unrestricted progress of the universe as a whole must be 
recognized, such that it advances to a higher state of cultivation, just as a great 
part of our earth is already subject to cultivation and will hereafter be so more 
and more ... As for the objection which may be raised, that if this is true the 
world will some time already have become paradise, the answer is not far to 
seek: even though many substances shall have attained to a great degree of 
perfection, there will always, on account of the infinite divisibility of the 
continuum, remain over in the abyss of things parts hitherto dormant, to be 
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aroused and raised to a greater degree and higher condition and, so to say, to a 
better cultivation. And for this reason progress will never come to an end.22 
 
How are we to square this with our tentative suggestion that Leibniz was, if anything, 
more favourable to the idea of a statically perfect Universe than to the hypothesis that 
the world increases in perfection? 
     Let us first consider the initial part of the first sentence. As Lovejoy reads it, it is 
clearly expressing the view that the Universe increases in perfection (‘A cumulative 
increase of the beauty and universal perfection of the works of God, a perpetual and 
unrestricted progress of the universe as a whole must be recognized’). But given that 
we have already had reason to doubt Lovejoy’s own translations, it might be useful to 
determine first of all whether this sentence is an accurate rendering of the Latin or not. 
     The paper from which this sentence comes is a very popular one – De rerum 
originatione radicali - and has appeared in many different collections of Leibniz’ 
works, translated by many different scholars. Is there a consensus among scholars 
about what this sentence is actually saying? Curiously enough, no! The translations by 
Ariew & Garber, Wiener and Duncan all suggest that progress is something in 
addition to the progress in the Universe, by which I assume they mean that progress 
takes place without adding to or detracting from the world’s perfection;23 in 
                                                 
22 Quoted from Lovejoy op cit 257.  
23 Ariew & Garber: ‘In addition to the beauties and perfections of the totality of the divine works, we 
must also recognize a certain constant and unbounded progress in the whole universe, so that it always 
proceeds to greater development.’ (AG154) It should be noted that Daniel Garber, in private 
communication, has indicated that he is now dissatisfied with this translation. 
Weiner: ‘And in addition to the general beauty and perfection of the works of God, we must recognize 
a certain perpetual and very free progress of the whole universe, such that it advances always to still 
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Loemker’s translation it is suggested that we (men) are ‘the crown of the universal 
beauty and perfection of the works of God’, and progress in the Universe is just 
something we must recognise (an interpretation apparently shared by Schrecker & 
Schrecker, though their translation is somewhat more obscure);24 while Parkinson’s 
translation says that the progress of the Universe is ‘towards a consummation of the 
universal beauty and perfection of the works of God.’25 
     Thus in the main English editions of Leibniz’ writings we find no less than three 
completely different renderings of the same sentence! What can we glean from all 
this, aside from the fact that Leibniz is often horrendously difficult to translate? My 
own view is that the Parkinson translation is the closest to the actual Latin of all those 
we have considered, though I suggest the sentence ought to be rendered as: 
 
Furthermore, it must be recognised that there is a perpetual and most free 
progress of the whole universe towards a consummation of the 
                                                                                                                                            
greater improvement’ (W354). This is identical to the translation in the volume by Duncan aside from 
Duncan ending the sentence with ‘refinement’ rather than ‘improvement’ (Dn113). 
24 Loemker: ‘As the crown of the universal beauty and perfection of the works of God, we must also 
recognize that the entire universe is involved in a perpetual and most free progress, so that it is always 
advancing towards greater culture.’ (L490-91) 
Schrecker & Schrecker: ‘As the climax of the universal beauty and perfection of God’s works, it must 
also be recognised that the total universe is engaged in a perpetual and spontaneous progress, so that it 
always advances towards greater culture.’ (S93) 
25 Parkinson: ‘Further, we realise that there is a perpetual and a most free progress of the whole 
universe towards a consummation of the universal beauty and perfection of the works of God, so that it 
is advancing towards a greater development’ (P144) 
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universal beauty and perfection of the works of God, so that it is always 
advancing towards greater cultivation.26 
 
The reference to progress remains intact, but now it is clear that this progress, 
whatever it may consist in, consummates (i.e. is the finishing touch to) the perfection 
of the Universe. This is not the same thing as saying, as Lovejoy’s translation does, 
that there is an increase in the world’s perfection. 
     But surely, it will be argued, this is just splitting hairs? Although we know now 
that Leibniz is not saying outright that the world increases in perfection, he is saying 
that there is a progress of the whole Universe, and that this progress consummates the 
world’s perfection. Clearly, then, the world must be increasing in perfection. 
      It would be wrong, I think, to construe the passage this way. For to do so is to 
suggest the Universe increases in perfection until it reaches the highest degree of 
perfection attainable. But in neither the triangle hypothesis nor the hyperbola 
hypothesis is it suggested that the world increases in perfection for a time and then 
stops because it can go no further.27 In both hypotheses perfection is considered to 
continue increasing for however long the Universe is in existence, and thus if the 
Universe does increase in perfection then it never reaches a limit. 
     To be sure that the progress of which Leibniz speaks is not progress in perfection, 
we need to explain what exactly Leibniz does mean by progress in this text. Here is 
the rest of the passage quoted by Lovejoy, suitably corrected: 
                                                 
26 ‘In cumulum etiam pulchritudinis perfectionisque universalis operum divinorum, progressus quidam 
perpetuus liberrimusque totius universi est agnoscendus, ita ut ad majorem semper cultum procedat’ (G 
VII 308). 




Just as now a great part of our earth has received cultivation, and will receive it 
more and more.... And to the objection that could be raised: that if this was so 
the world would already have been made paradise, my response is ready: 
although many substances have already come to great perfection, nevertheless 
because of the divisibility to infinity of the continuum, there always remain in 
the abyss of things parts that hitherto have been asleep, to be awakened and to 
be driven on to something greater and better, and as I may put it in a word, to a 
better state of cultivation. And hence progress never comes to an end. (G VII 
308) 
 
Interestingly, Leibniz appears here to be suggesting that progress is not the same thing 
as improvement! In fact it seems to be the very same neutral conception of progress 
that I suggested was intended in his remarks on progress to the Electress Sophie. That 
is, progress is merely a term to describe change over time, manifested in the 
continuous unfolding of what is contained in each substance. But while every 
substance does indeed attain the highest degree of perfection of which it is capable at 
any one time, we know from elsewhere in the Leibnizian corpus that they do not 
maintain it: death brings about a lessening of a substance’s perfection. 
     I cannot be entirely certain that this is the point Leibniz is trying to make in De 
rerum originatione radicali, but even if it is not, there is another reason for 
considering that Leibniz is not here advocating a policy of increasing perfection.28 We 
                                                 
28 Andrew Carlson opts for an entirely different interpretation of the progress referred to in De rerum 
originatione radicali, suggesting that it is to be understood in terms of salvation, or rather in the 
increase of the numbers saved over eternity; for ‘over endless time ... even the worst sinners will 
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have already seen that there are only two ways in which the Universe could be said to 
increase in perfection – if it contains either more things or better things at one time 
than at an earlier time. Leibniz, as we know, rules out the first option unequivocally, 
while consistently fails to advocate the second option. The fact that he fails to use 
obvious words such as ‘better’, ‘improving’ or ‘increasing’ in the above passage is 
very revealing in itself, as it suggests that he is again refusing to endorse the second 
option. 
 
The seeds of doubt 
I stated earlier the tentative view that Leibniz held the hypothesis of the rectangle to 
be true, at least for part of his philosophical career, after which doubts set in and he 
became agnostic on the matter. The question we must ask now is why this happened. 
                                                                                                                                            
eventually be inclined to give up their hatred of God and enter onto the path of righteousness.’ This 
strikes me as lacking in both plausibility and textual support. It is implausible because in the Confessio 
Philosophi Leibniz makes it clear that those whom God does not save do not then go on to achieve 
salvation at some later time (A VI iii 138-139); and it lacks textual support because there is nothing in 
the passage under discussion that implies or even vaguely suggests Leibniz is referring to salvation. See 
Andrew Carlson The divine ethic of creation in Leibniz (New York, 2001), 643. Another interpretation 
of the progress referred to in De rerum originatione radicali has been put forward by Juan A. Nicolas, 
who argues that, for Leibniz, ‘The realisation of the best of worlds does not ... take place all at once; it 
is rather a matter of an historic process, with its progressions and regressions, and in which man plays 
an important role.’ Through man’s decisions and actions, Nicolas tells us, justice and happiness are 
made possible. If Nicolas’ interpretation is right, Leibniz’ talk of ‘substances being awakened’ must be 
taken figuratively rather than literally, to refer to advancements in knowledge and understanding. 
However it seems something of a stretch to interpret it this way. See Juan A. Nicolas ‘La rationalité 
morale du Monde chez Leibniz’ in Leibniz: Le meilleur des Mondes, ed by Albert Heinekamp & André 
Robinet (Stuttgart, 1992) 168. 
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     I believe the roots of the answer lie in Leibniz’ thoughts about physical perfection 
(happiness). This form of perfection, he asserts throughout his career, is subject to an 
unending increase over the course of time: 
 
our happiness will never consist, and ought never to consist, in complete joy, 
which leaves nothing to be desired and which would stupefy our spirit, but in a 
perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections. (L641, cf. G VII 568) 
 
Two things ought to be noted about this claim. Firstly, the start of the continuous 
increase is deferred to ‘the future’ (S125), in ‘another life’ (L564) after ‘the books are 
balanced’ (L218). Secondly, the perpetual increase only applies to some souls, not all. 
A small minority will experience ever-increasing happiness, while an unfortunate 
majority will become ever more unhappy (cf. A VI iii 139). It is clear from this, I 
think, that Leibniz is looking to the afterlife to trigger this twin escalation of 
happiness and unhappiness, and the event that initiates it is the administering of divine 
justice, where some souls are saved and elevated into God’s presence for eternity 
while others are damned and shut out from His presence forever (and perhaps cast 
down to hell). 
     Leibniz’ best of all possible worlds thus comprises two distinct stages. The first 
stage is the mortal world we know, where creatures are born, live and then fall into 
slumber. The second stage sees the simultaneous re-awakening of all sleeping 
creatures in order for justice to be administered, some creatures being saved and 
granted an eternal communion with God, others being damned and forced to eternally 
wallow in their own increasing misery. Leibniz clearly considers both stages to be 
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part of the same world as he defines the world as ‘the whole succession and the whole 
agglomeration of all existent things.’ (H128, cf. S116) 
     One might wonder why all this is relevant; after all, the fact that a creature’s 
physical perfection may increase without end in the second stage of the Universe does 
not seem to have any obvious link to whether its metaphysical perfection increases. 
But as it happens there is a link, as any increase in physical perfection can only come 
about through a prior increase in metaphysical perfection, as is clear from the 
following remark in the New Essays: 
 
I doubt that a greatest pleasure is possible; I am inclined to believe that it can 
increase ad infinitum, for we do not know how far our knowledge and our 
organs can be developed in the course of the eternity which lies before us. So I 
would think that happiness is a lasting pleasure, which cannot occur without a 
continual progress to new pleasures (NE194) 
 
What Leibniz reveals here is that happiness increases because of an increase in 
knowledge (of God, in this case), and knowledge, as we know, is one of the attributes 
that determines a creature’s overall degree of metaphysical perfection. So the more 
knowledge a creature has, the happier it becomes, and if a creature’s happiness 
increases ad infinitum, as Leibniz confirms, then this is because its metaphysical 
perfection is increasing ad infinitum. It thus follows, then, that blessed creatures 
experience a continual increase in perfection (metaphysical and physical) while the 
damned suffer a continual decrease in perfection.29 
                                                 
29 Moral perfection likewise increases and decreases, as the wiser one is the more virtuous one is, and 
vice versa. 
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     Now we know that Leibniz believed in a statically perfect Universe for at least 
some of his philosophical career. We can now see that such a Universe will have to 
preserve a particular degree of perfection throughout both stages of its existence. That 
is to say, the Universe must remain as equally perfect throughout the whole of the first 
stage as it must throughout the whole of the second stage, for only then can it truly be 
said to remain equally perfect at all times. This view thus entails that, when the 
second stage of the Universe begins, after divine judgement has been meted out, the 
increases in perfection enjoyed by the blessed are equal to the decreases in perfection 
suffered by the damned. In An mundus perfectione crescat, Leibniz concurs with this 
analysis: 
 
If the perfection of the world remains the same, some substances cannot 
continually increase in perfection without others continually decreasing in 
perfection. (Gr95) 
 
This, then, was Leibniz’ opinion during the time he believed in a statically perfect 
Universe. As he eventually fell into uncertainty on this matter, and decided not to 
categorically rule out the possibility that the Universe was ameliorative, one might 
expect to find in his later writings some basis for this uncertainty. Given what we now 
know about the two-stage Universe, and the fact that continuous increases in 
perfection are only possible for creatures in the second stage, Leibniz must have come 
to question whether the perfection of the Universe remained static in this second 
stage. So what we might hope to find in Leibniz’ later writings is a consideration of 
the possibility that the Universe might increase in perfection during this second (post-
judgement) stage. And in the Theodicy this is precisely what we do find: 
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For it is possible, and even a very reasonable thing, that the glory and the 
perfection of the blessed may be incomparably greater than the misery and 
imperfection of the damned, and that here the excellence of the total good in the 
smaller number may exceed the total evil which is in the greater number. 
(H379) 
 
What Leibniz is considering here is whether the increases in perfection experienced 
by the elect might outweigh the decreases in perfection suffered by the damned. If that 
does indeed occur then the world can be said to increase in perfection, at least in the 
second of its two distinct stages. But Leibniz only considers this to be ‘possible’ and 
‘reasonable’, and he falls some way short of actually endorsing it. Nevertheless his 
speculation on this matter ties in with his documented uncertainty on the question of 
whether the world increases in perfection and explains why he became uncertain 
about that. 
     One final question remains, however. Why did he come to think that the increases 
in perfection of the blessed might outweigh the decreases in perfection of the 
damned? In an early work, the Confessio Philosophi from 1672-3, Leibniz has this to 
say on the matter: 
 
the blessed...experience delight incessantly...because without perpetual novelty 
and progress there is no thinking and hence no pleasure...[yet] those who are 
furiously against the nature of things...they will be continually irritated by new 
objects of indignation, of hatred, of jealousy and, to say it in one word, of 
madness. (A VI iii 139) 
 
29 
Yet almost 40 years later in the Theodicy, Leibniz was not so quick to state that the 
damned continually get worse, arguing instead that in their descent they would 
eventually reach or at least approach a lowest possible limit: 
 
The blessed draw near to divinity through a divine Mediator, so far as can 
belong to these created beings, and make such progress in good as is impossible 
for the damned to make in evil, even though they should approach as nearly as 
may be the nature of demons. God is infinite, and the devil is finite; good can 
and does go on ad infinitum, whereas evil has its bounds. (H379) 
 
It might seem odd that the later Leibniz was so certain that the blessed undergo an 
unlimited increase in perfection and the damned a limited decrease in perfection, 
while remaining uncertain on the question of whether the Universe as a whole 
increases in perfection. But it is not really odd at all, for with the fates of an infinity of 
creatures to take into consideration even a superlative mathematician like Leibniz was 
at a loss to calculate whether the infinite gains made by some creatures either 
balanced or outweighed the finite losses incurred by what was presumably an infinity 
of others. And this, I suspect, was why he informed Bourguet that he could see no 
way of demonstrating which one of the rectangle, triangle and hyperbola hypotheses 
was true.30 31 
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30 Full English translations of many of the previously-untranslated Leibniz texts cited in this paper can 
be found on my website at http://www.leibniz-translations.com  
31 My thanks to Vernon Pratt, Patrick Sherry and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad for their comments and 
suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. 
